The Drafting of a Master Plan for Roma Capitale: An Exordium

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The first master plan of modern Rome has not had many friends. Fascist commentary chided its timidity. Post-war critics of the Left have been heaping scorn upon it as a document of capitalist greed and the exploitation of the people. Perhaps this stern reception is inescapable. Planning is quintessentially a political act. A legal master plan exposes in graphic form the prevailing order of society and the government it sustains. And the Liberal State of the first decades of Italy’s history as a European nation has been unpopular with both the Right and the Left.

In the case of Rome, the dual pressure of the resident Church and the mystique of ancient glory has compounded politics with passion. Through one perspective, the Master Plan of 1883 (Fig. 1) was seen as the outcome of the suppression of the Church, especially its territorial structure; at the same time, it was thought to reflect the mean-spiritedness of a State unwilling to celebrate in a fitting way the modern resurgence of distant splendor. It was up to the Fascist regime to make amends on both scores. Through the opposite perspective, the wresting of Rome from papal rule in 1870 was a sham. Nothing really changed. The national government ensured the continued existence of a privileged class which lived at the expense of the people. Free enterprise helped to enlarge the scope of this ruling class, but there was no true difference in the social substructure. The Church retained its hold by supplanting feudal territoriality with capitalism. As for the image of resurgent glory, that too was shaped with total indifference to the interests of the common man. Where the profit and convenience of the ruling class made it expedient, the past was summarily sacrificed. Patrician villas vanished under the developer’s grid—and with them vanished the people’s green. Where the decorum of the ruling class demanded the isolation of ancient relics, or ample avenues cut through the older fabric, it was common people and their unhealthy tenements that were found to be standing in the way.

It should be possible to study the Master Plan of 1883 from a third perspective, that is, to consider it a representative document of the course of democracy as this was understood by the Liberal State. This should not mean suspending criticism and taking the product as the justification of the process, or the reverse. The aim would be to observe what happened, how it happened, and why, rather than engaging in ex post facto ideological polemics about what should have happened.

It may be that the proper critical attitude for such a study presupposes a “liberal” political stance which registers discomfort at the wholesale grandeur of authoritarian regimes, but declines to see in capitalism the specter of original sin. Whatever the case, it is the position of this writer that a careful and complete account of the Master Plan of 1883 remains unachieved. To undertake this task entails the investigative chronicling of all events, issues, and personalities that informed the drafting of this first official plan for the new capital of Italy—from the appointment of an initial planning commission on 30 September 1870, a mere ten days after the Breach of Porta Pia and the collapse of papal power, to the culminating sessions of the city council in the summer of

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Fig. 1. The Master Plan of 1883 (courtesy: The Robert H. Lowie Museum of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley).
1882 when, its very last detail having been debated and approved, jubilant councilmen proposed to have the plan painted in the halls of the Capitoline or engraved on marble like the ancient *Forma urbis*, “to retain of it perpetual memory.”

It is a long and tangled story of politicians, engineers, and speculators, projects and counterprojects, and a three-sided jurisdictional rivalry among State, provincial, and municipal authorities and the discrete factions within each; a story of blunders, special interests, patriotic pride, the willful or misguided destruction of building, and fortunes entered in the fray to be multiplied manifold or lost overnight. And it is a story that can be told. Many drawings still survive in State and city archives, and the acts of the city council, regularly published since 1870, provide a continual record of the contribution of the major protagonist.

The reward for such a scholarly effort is to document the process of urban design in Rome, in the context of a democratic society and against the background of a celebrated pattern of the past which supplied much of the content for the abstract lines of the modern designer; to understand the remarkable complication of a visual program that was the result of social, political, economic, and aesthetic choices on the part of the city, and which in turn affected measurably the future field of these choices.

While a comprehensive study such as the one here proposed is in preparation, the limited purpose of the present paper is to set out the scope and nature of this famous blueprint known as “Piano regolatore e di ampliamento della città di Roma” and speak of the ways and means of its creation. To assist the reader with undetailed references and the string of commissions and legal actions involved, a chronological outline of events is appended.

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Viewed with some detachment, the Plan of 1883 should surprise us by its very existence. The product of endless debate and compromises, it represents an uneasy union between private gain and public good. By contrast, nineteenth-century London was planless, Paris and Vienna models of simple decision making. The plan of Paris was spawned by one man—Napoleon III. He drew it up as he wanted it, knowing that he had the power to see it executed. He presented this plan, with lines drawn on the existing fabric in four contrasting colors indicating relative urgency, to his newly appointed Prefect of the Seine, Georges Haussmann. A planning commission set up to help the Prefect develop this sketch into a full-blown master plan met once, and then dissolved itself. Emperor and Prefect, thereafter, made all major planning decisions. Periodically the Municipal Council and the Legislative Assembly were consulted on financial matters, but even then the authority of the potent two-man team was, for the most part, unchallengable.3

Vienna too was planned by imperial decree. On 20 December 1857, Franz Joseph issued a proclamation addressed to his Minister of the Interior, Freiherr von Bach, listing all the central elements for a new master plan: demolition of the old city walls, and the sale of the resulting land for speculative building; prescriptions for the development of this intermediate zone between the mediaeval core and the outlying suburbs; disposition of the new public buildings. All that remained was to call a competition to derive a visual design for this willed renewal. “For the purpose of obtaining a ground plan, a competition is to be promoted, and a programme is to be drawn up on the lines of the principles herein indicated, but nevertheless with freedom of conditions, so that the competitors may be allowed free scope for the conception of their designs, consistent with the carrying out of the proposals herein contained.”4

But many European cities did not possess a legally binding plan, whether autocratically or democratically conceived. The principle of eminent domain was either not specified in law or else severely curtailed; and without this principle, and a strong municipal administration, an urban plan was a pointless gesture. In London, there was no general municipal structure until the Metropolitan Board of Works was established in 1853, and even then its jurisdiction over the whole of London was limited to matters of street lighting, drainage, and occasional “improvements” such as the opening of Shaftesbury Avenue. Only in 1883 was the elective London County Council set up, and it straightway undertook to bring about municipal reform. But the great estates continued to be planned, in all essential details, by the landowners—noble families and corporations—with minimal observance of certain city laws on building materials and heights. The smooth integration of a newly planned estate with the rest of the urban fabric was not a recognized responsibility.5

Modern Italy, by contrast, provided for municipal legislation of the city-form from the very start. On 25 June 1865, in connection with the rebuilding of Naples, a bill was passed


entitled “Expropriation for Works in the Public Interest,” which remained in effect, with minor changes, until 1942. In the context of this Expropriation Bill, works in the public interest (pubblica utilità) referred to projects of any scale originated not only by the State and by provincial and municipal authorities, but also by corporations, private firms, and single individuals (Article 2). A master plan proposed by the city council, called piano regolatore, was an all-encompassing blueprint for the city-form. Article 86 of the bill states: “Cities in which there is to be found a population of at least ten thousand souls could, for the sake of the common good determined by existing need to provide for the general health and requisite communications, draw up a master plan in which are traced the lines to be followed in the rebuilding.” Once prepared by the city, the plan had to be offered to public scrutiny for a period of two weeks, and formally adopted by the council only after due consideration of any objections to it that might be raised by individuals and organized groups. It would then be passed on to the provincial authorities and to the National Council for Public Works (Consiglio superiore dei lavori pubblici) and signed into law by the King upon the final recommendation of the Minister of Public Works (Article 87). Based on this document the city could initiate wholesale expropriation.

The bill distinguished this legal master plan from a piano di ampliamento. The latter applied to the expansion of the residential core beyond the limits of the master plan and outside its special jurisdiction. The purpose was to set norms to be followed by developers in suburban construction, in order “to ensure the proper sanitation of the new development, and its safe, convenient, and decorous disposition” (Article 93). Property owners were obliged to cede the land free of charge for public streets built within the area by the city.

Expansion was the first order of business for the new capital of Italy. At the time of its fall to the Royal Italian Army on 20 September 1870, papal Rome had a population of about 250,000. There was now the immediate need to accommodate the anticipated crush in the wake of the transfer of the national government. But in this respect too the Roman case was different. The physical size of other European capitals was several times that of Rome. Paris had a population of close to two million in 1870; London with its county, over three million. They had long spilled out of their historical frame. The urban task they faced was to integrate the traditional center with the more recently developed periphery. In London large empty tracts lay between the far-flung boroughs and the core; during the nineteenth century, in addition to growing outward, these gaps in the city fabric were being filled in. Franz Joseph’s master plan for Vienna was intended to connect the inner city with the extensive suburban tissue by developing the void zone of the old walls.

But in Rome no extramural growth had been witnessed for centuries. The historic city, defined by the walls of Aurelian and the sixteenth–seventeenth-century ring around the Gianicolo and the Vatican, was surrounded on all sides by empty countryside. What is more, within its legal limits there were vast open spaces. Urban recovery, following the point of maximum shrinkage and decay in the Middle Ages, had pushed the residential core toward the edges of the eastern hills, but the slopes and summits of the Quirinal, Viminal, and Esquiline were still free of development in 1870, and covered with vineyards, farmland, and aristocratic villas. The placement of the main station for Pius IX’s railroad system on the Viminal, south of the Baths of Diocletian, had had no immediate impact on the rural character of this region. Monsignor De Merode’s famous layout between the exedra of the Baths and Via delle Quattro Fontane had made little headway, despite an agreement between the prelate and the city in April 1867 according to which the city undertook to build the roads for the new quarter and bring in the services. Although most of the lots had been sold since 1866, construction was very slow; the only building to be completed at the time of the Breach of Porta Pia was the palazzo at the corner of the present Via Nazionale–Via Torino.

The south and southeastern part of the city, with its heavy concentration of ancient remains, was also countryside. This graveyard of history—the Circus Maximus and the Antonine Baths, the Palatine complex, the Roman Forum, the Colosseum—impeded the orderly growth of the residential core in this direction. And it was not the only hallowed obstacle to speedy expansion and the updating of the city for its new destiny. Rome was an international city. It was a monument in its entirety, an untidy relic considered inviolable by many in the Western world. Foreign opinion about its fate could not be ignored. To the historian Ferdinand Gregorovius, an eloquent witness to the massive transformation of the city after the Breach, the issue appeared clear.

Today, as in ancient times, cultured people revere Rome as the most noble monument of history. . . . For thirteen centuries the papacy had been entrusted with the protection of Rome, and it had carried out its task with the deepest understanding for the character of the city. When its worldly dominion was ended, Europe, in unison, placed the Eternal City under the protection of united Italy, and . . . never on earth did a people acquire a more illustrious capital, and with it an equally heavy responsibility before the entire civilized world. 7


Internal politics colored the planning of Rome as well. To the extent that Rome was thought by outsiders to be an international city, and to the extent that it had figured within as the central focus of the struggle for national unity during the Risorgimento, the new capital was a symbolic and emotional inevitability. But it was not embraced by the national government with the same conviction that tied Paris to the Second Empire or Vienna to Hapsburg rule. The northern Savoy dynasty adopted Rome no more readily than it had Florence as the temporary capital of the new Kingdom from 1865 to 1871. Victor Emmanuel II, the first King of Italy, spent little time in Rome after the transfer of the court; he preferred the Alps and the countryside of Pisa. Rome was not his city the way Paris was Napoleon’s or Vienna was Franz Joseph’s.

Parliament itself was in no mood to spend much money on Rome. Italy had many important historical centers. The delegates from north and south displayed open antipathy toward the notion of providing for the disproportionate glorification of this much-sung city; they looked with disfavor on the expenditure of the resources of their own constituencies for the renovation of Rome. Requests by the city for State assistance went unheeded for a number of years—with grave consequences. That Rome had been elevated to be the first city of the Kingdom was reward enough, the State argued. As Minister of Finance Marco Minghetti put it in 1875, “The title of capital is more a cause for lucre than expense.”9 The first official version of the master plan, ratified by the city in September 1873 (Fig. 2), was shelved for nine years without receiving final legal status precisely because of the financial uncertainty about its future execution.

At first all the city could extract from the State was a Minghetti promise to suspend the State building tax for a period of fifteen years for all new construction in one-third of the Esquiline being developed by the city. Talk of an annual State subsidy got nowhere until Victor Emmanuel’s successor, Humbert I, showed open support for his capital by urging the government to act. In his opening speech to Parliament on 17 February 1880, the popular King declared that the State was obliged to help finance “the indispensable works for the health and decorum of Rome, which created the unity and grandeur of the first Italy, and should not have to play host to the new Italy only through memories of past fortunes.”9 The final settlement, when it came, did more to establish the principle of State assistance than to relieve the financial anxiety of such a mammoth project. The city was assured fifty million lire over a period of twenty years, but of this, thirty million were to go toward the cost of mandated State programs such as a palace of justice, an academy of sciences, a polyclinic, and military installations such as barracks, a hospital, and a parade ground. In addition, the city was compelled to put in the plan the demolition of the Ghetto and its redevelopment, the completion of the main east-west artery of Via Nazionale beyond Piazza Venezia (Corso Vittorio Emanuele), and suburban bridges over the Tiber.

From the outset the State’s presence critically affected the city-form. Seats of the major government institutions, whether new structures or older reused ones, served as strong foci which generated and conditioned urban activity. Three of the most important of these were the Quirinal palace, taken over as the official royal residence; Palazzo Madama near Piazza Navona, renovated in 1871 by the engineer Luigi Gabet as the new Senate building; and Palazzo Montecitorio, the papal lawcourts since 1694, now housing the national Parliament. These and others helped to bring about new residential and traffic patterns. The new Ministry of Finance on Via XX Settembre (Michelangelo’s Strada Pia), a vast pile between Porta Pia, where Royalist troops broke through the walls on 20 September 1870, and the Quirinal palace, became the nucleus of a new quarter patronized by the populous ministerial bureaucracy.10

Where these installations were placed was often beyond municipal control. A government commission established on 3 February 1871 had been charged with the orderly transfer of the capital from Florence. Armed with a law which gave the State power to appropriate any key building in the city for its own immediate use, a considerable extension of the Expropriation Bill of 1865, the commission made all arrangements for the location of government agencies. The Ministry of Public Works controlled the erection of new government buildings; wishes of its clients were frequently at odds with city intentions. The siting of the Ministry of War on the Quirinal is a specific case in point. Pursuing the vision of Quintino Sella, the powerful Minister of Finance in the government of Giovanni Lanza, for a grand avenue of ministries from Porta Pia to the Quirinal palace to serve as the spinal cord of the new capital, a group of former monastic structures was consolidated for the war bureaucracy just south of Sella’s own enormous ministry, on the same side of Via XX Settembre. The decision was taken in the plain knowledge that it conflicted with the early plans of the city for this area. They envisaged a road parallel to Via Nazio-

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8. Cited by Bianchi in Capitoleium, x (1934), 34.
9. Ibid., p. 36.
10. For a critical study of this building and the rôle of Quintino Sella in the planning of Rome, see E. Schroeter, “Rome’s First National State Architecture in Terms of Capitalist Ideology and Politics,” in a forthcoming volume being published by MIT Press on art and architecture in the service of politics.
Fig. 2. The Master Plan of 1873.
Fig. 3. (a) The area of the Viminal Hill as laid out in the Plan of 1873, revised in accordance with the agreement between the State and the city signed on 13 February 1881, and made legal through a royal decree issued on 16 June 1881. (b) The same area today, with the Ministry of the Interior (Palazzo del Viminale) built in 1920 after designs by Manfredo Manfredi.
 nale, whose intended line is now indicated by the blind Via Piacenza interrupted north of Via delle Quattro Fontane by the bulk of the Ministry of War (Fig. 3a/b).

The debate also involved the foundation of a new university complex nearby. With the prompting of Sella, momentarily at the head of the Ministry of Public Instruction, the site chosen by the State was where the Ministry of the Interior now sits, that is, the polygonal piece of land bounded by Via Nazionale, Via dei Serpenti, Via Panisperna/Santa Maria Maggiore, and Via Depretis. An initial grandiloquent project by Gabet callously disrupted the street grid adopted for the area in the Plan of 1873. The main building of the university was to sit precisely at the point where Via Viminale, starting at the train station, met the transverse Via Milano. The university complex further interrupted two other transverse streets north of Via Milano, namely, Via Genova and Via Venezia. Subsequent reductions of the Gabet scheme did not solve the crisis between city and State. During the negotiations, the Ministry of Public Instruction erected a large greenhouse at the juncture of Via Viminale and Via Milano to set its claim on the contested ground. The controversy raged until late 1880 when Guido Bacelli, a city councilman who had been elevated to the post of Minister of Public Instruction, brought the two parties together on a compromise plan, ratified on 13 February 1881, that retained the greenhouse but also allowed Via Milano to be carried over eastward until Via Panisperna (Fig. 3a).11

In one other crucial respect the State influenced the planning of Rome. In part to continue the favored industrialization of the north and in part to avoid the potentially troublesome presence of masses of workers in the new capital, the State discouraged both industry and trade here. Historically, Rome had always been a consumer city; its only major exportable product had been political power. Papal Rome prior to 1870 had no industry to speak of, with the exception of the tobacco manufactory (Tabacchi) at Trastevere. The rudimentary railroad system initiated in the 1850s reached no further than Civitavecchia and Frascati. The national government promptly strapped Rome to the rest of the Kingdom through a substantial rail network, but this improved pattern of transportation was not meant to serve as a new economic infrastructure. Rome was to remain the center of governmental bureaucracy. Tourism and building were to be its only prime industries. Consequently the city-form could exist free of the pressures that the heavy concentration of an industrial class produced in capitals like Paris and London.12

The only concession made to industry was Testaccio. Around this artificial hill an industrial quarter was first postulated by the Camporesi Commission in November 1870, and it remained a constant idea in all subsequent revisions of the master plan until the final version of 1883. The site had obvious advantages, it was argued. The Tiber was navigable up to this point and no further. This meant that river transport southward could assist the rail transport provided for by the Civitavecchia line that passed just outside the walls. And the extrarural location of the docks and warehouses would exempt them from the onus of consumption duties, a considerable encouragement to industry. But all this may have been, at least in part, rationalization for the official policy of excluding a troublesome proletariat from within the legal bounds of the capital, a policy that sought to justify itself initially through the papal building code of 1864, the “Regolamento edilizio e di pubblico ornato per la città di Roma.” According to the code, “the practice of those arts which because of foul smell and dirt become inconvenient and pernicious to the neighborhood is permitted only in quarters of low density, away from the urban center.”

In fact, once invented, Testaccio became the receptacle for unattractive urban functions. When the main slaughterhouse of the city, long outside Porta del Popolo, stood in the way of the intended residential nucleus west of Via Flaminia, it was moved to Testaccio as a matter of course. The central market called for by the State Assistance Bill of 1881 was likewise assigned there. Again, when the Ghetto was finally demolished and redeveloped for the upper-middle class, the first thought was to move displaced Jewish businesses to Testaccio. The quarter was physically isolated from the rest of the city-form not only because of its extrarural site at the southwest corner of the walls, but also because the two major arteries that were to lead in and out of it, the Lungotevere and a road running between the two spurs of the Aventine in the direction of the Colosseum (the present Viale Aventino), clearly bypassed the center. The exclusively industrial destination of the quarter also managed to isolate the working proletariat from the rest of the population, and this despite disavowals of social segregation such as that in the report of the Committee of Four: “Quarters destined exclusively for the less-well-to-do are not admissible; we recommend instead that [these people] be distributed in suitable lodgings incorporated within structures where those better favored by fortune are to reside.”13


12. Roma, città e piani, p. 79.
istic. The cost of rebuilding Rome was open-ended; municipal revenues, finite and paltry. Much of the annual budget was earmarked for public works. In 1872, for example, the sum of 11 million lire was allocated for this purpose out of a total outlay of 20.5 million for municipal expenditures. Next year the allocation went up to a phenomenal 32.5 million, the start of a recurrent trend of overspending that would lead to the city’s near bankruptcy by 1888. But even with such extravagant budgeting, the scale of the project made imperative the solicitation of massive loans. In 1871 a long-term loan for 150 million lire had been negotiated with the Banca Nazionale, and by 1874 the initial installment of 30 million had already been spent.\textsuperscript{14}

One problem was habitual miscalculation of costs, especially estimates of expropriation. The process itself was slow; appeal and counterappeal were built into the law. Subsequent to the signing of the decree of eminent domain, the city was obligated to make a reasonable offer for each piece of property it intended to expropriate, and to post the sum in question with the Cassa dei Depositi e Prestiti. With or without a specific challenge from the property owner, the courts would then appoint, in accordance with Article 36 of the Expropriation Bill, one or more experts called periti to assess the fairness of the indemnity and make recommendations to the court. The periti were drawn among architects, engineers, and agronomists. The city could appeal their assessment, and the long contest of bargaining would thus be joined. The final outcome almost always favored the owner, keeping the city’s public works budget permanently out of kilter. To cite one example: the Ufficio tecnico estimated that expropriation costs for the first stretch of Via Nazionale (to Via Quirinale) would amount to 2.5 million lire; after the last court appeal was concluded, the figure had soared to 6.5 million.

The city council resisted imposing special taxes to relieve the heavy burden of Rome’s new status. It refused to make firm demands on speculators and developers. On the contrary, it sought repeatedly to have the State building tax waived to encourage private initiative. The government demurred. At the same time, the city appealed to the State to allow it to keep all of the monies raised through consumption duties, its major source of revenue. Here too there was considerable friction. In 1871 the city was asked to turn in three million of the total sum to the State; the city obeyed under protest, threatening at one moment to stop all public works needed for the functioning of the new capital. According to its own calculation 44 million lire out of the 150-million loan from the Banca Nazionale was eventually paid out in State taxes.\textsuperscript{15}

But beyond its steady financial bind, the city suffered from internal maladministration and a surfeit of extramunicipal bureaucracy. The top leadership of the city, called the Giunta and consisting of the mayor and a number of clerks (assessori), changed frequently. No fewer than fifteen upsets or shuffles of the Giunta took place between 1870 and 1882; the average tenure of the Giunta was less than one year. Planning policy being often the cause for resignations or votes of no confidence, the administrative turnover meant regular reversals on the question of the master plan and the program of public works. Each Giunta could therefore hardly muster enough momentum to cope with State recalcitrance and fight self-serving pressures from the private sector. Besides, Giunta members and councilmen were caught on occasion in a conflict of interest. They would buy land and speculate as private citizens, while participating in the drafting of laws for the disposition of such land. If activity of this kind, when it occurred, could not always be considered proved collusion, it nonetheless gave rise to doubts in the public mind.

The municipal structure for the planning process was not in itself unwieldy or excessive. The main responsibility for the study and preparation of physical proposals lay with the Ufficio d’arte comunale, also known as Ufficio tecnico. General supervision was exercised on behalf of the Giunta by clerks of building and planning (assessore dell’edilizia and assessore del piano regolatore). Unanimity in these circles was not, however, the rule. On the issue of Via Nazionale and its terminal outlet, for example, the chief of the Ufficio tecnico disagreed with his assessore and the lower men in the office defied the chief by submitting variant projects of their own.\textsuperscript{16}

Proposals generated by the Ufficio tecnico, and alternate solutions from the outside, were reviewed by special elected committees of the council, and their reports were then debated by the council at large. In matters of keen controversy such as Via Nazionale, the council also sought the advice of professional organizations, specifically, the Circolo tecnico d’ingegneri, architetti, agronomi di Roma and the prestigious high council of fine arts, the Accademia di San Luca.

But this municipal structure of decision making linked up with other jurisdictions. The province of Rome, with offices on Piazza SS. Apostoli, had ultimate control over the pro-

\textsuperscript{14} For this and much other useful information regarding the city history of modern Rome, see E. Arbib, Sommario degli atti del Consiglio comunale di Roma... (Rome/Florence, 1895), a convenient narrative culled by an insider from city council acts of twenty-five years.

\textsuperscript{15} Arbib, Sommario, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{16} See Atti, 1 (1875), 292–925, for these competing designs and their discussion by the council. The internal strife of the Fifth Department, Construction and Public Works, is specifically decried by councilman E. Ruspoli on p. 765.
procedure of expropriation. In addition, all planning proposals that affected extramural highways, sewage, and matters of sanitation in general came under its purview. It had its own Ufficio tecnico that produced designs, and a health council (Consiglio provinciale di sanità). In matters relating to the Tiber, the disposition of railroad stations, and of course the accommodation of its agencies, the State held its own counsel. Where these State interests were concerned, the civil corps of engineers (Ufficio del Genio civile) participated in planning and design decisions. The army corps of engineers (Genio militare) exercised responsibility on issues pertaining to defense: for example, the ring of forts erected after 1870 around the city, the placement and construction of barracks, and the like. The Ministry of Commerce ruled on bridges over the Tiber. Decisions bearing on relics of antiquity with national standing had to be cleared with the Soprintendenza degli scavi, a department of the Ministry of Public Instruction. Finally, the Ministry of Public Works through its review board, the National Council of Public Works already referred to, retained general supervision for all proposals that evoked the principle of eminent domain, as well as all major State undertakings within the city. The King’s direct representation in planning matters came through a royal supervisor of master plans, the Reggio commissario per i piani regolatori. In all this tangle of jurisdictions, it would have required a strong, stable city administration to follow up the fate of its projects, and it was precisely that element of administrative continuity and clarity of purpose that Rome did not have during the first two crucial decades as the nation’s capital.

One last agency entered the fray on 22 July 1873. On that day a commission entitled Giunta liquidatrice dell’asse ecclesiastico went into operation as a special branch of the Ministry of Justice.17 Its function was to oversee the secularization of Church property in and around Rome, the so-called asse ecclesiastico, in accordance with the national law passed on 15 August 1867 and applied to Rome on 19 June 1873. The law provided for the suppression of religious groups and the liquidation of their holdings in real estate. Prior to the national takeover, vast areas of land and other property were owned by tax-exempt groups with professed ecclesiastical affiliation. The Church and the nobility were in fact the two major landowners in the territory of Rome. In anticipation of the arrival of the secularization law to the new capital, religious orders had diligently adjusted the status of much of their patrimony to evade the law’s provisions. Nonetheless the Giunta liquidatrice found itself in control of 124 buildings and over 110,000 acres of land, of which some 17,000 were in the immediate district of Rome and the remainder in the Roman countryside.

These were disposed of at low rates, through direct sale or long leasing. The proceeds were intended by law to be assigned for the care of the inmates of suppressed orders and the continuation of legitimate charitable programs. But State and city needs could claim special attention. In fact, fifty-four of the disposable buildings had been relinquished to the State for its uses, either through the 1871 bill for the transfer of the capital or the bill for the abolition of the asse ecclesiastico. Another thirty-three had been ceded or sold to the city. With so much negotiable property in its care, the Giunta liquidatrice assumed a leading rôle in the planning of Rome. The ready availability and extremely low cost of this property became a major consideration in the siting of State and city institutions. The choice of the university site on the Viminal was made possible by the presence there of considerable Church property that could easily be assumed by the State.

The Church’s legal say in planning matters was minimal. Since the Vatican refused to recognize the Kingdom of Italy, no agreement concerning its rights could be negotiated. Reconciliation between Church and State had to await Mussolini’s Lateran Accords. In the meantime, protestations of the Church against specific planning decisions that affected her interests were ignored or rejected. A good instance in point is the formal objection registered on behalf of the Vatican against the Plan of 1873 during its public debate.18 Churches as public spaces were not subject to the Expropriation Bill of 1865, the argument read. No church, however small, could be demolished or altered in form or function without the beneplacito of the Vatican. In the past, the Vatican had agreed on rare occasions, when the public good demanded it, to have a small chapel razed. But the plan envisaged the destruction or significant alteration of fifteen churches: San Pantaleo would disappear, Santa Pudenziana would be separated from its monastery, San Vitale converted to royal stables. This claim was set aside by the council without discussion.

The coordination of these various agencies and the exercise of overall leadership in the planning of Roma capitale belonged with the city authorities. Yet municipal experience was severely limited. The only immediate precedent for the drawing up of a master plan was the blueprint that accompanied the papal building code of 1864, but this showed nothing more than partial intervention in the existing fabric

17. For a detailed account of the activities of the Giunta liquidatrice, see Monografia della città di Roma e della campagna romana (Rome, 1881), II, chap. 14 by C. Masotti.
to widen streets or straighten their course. The task of shaping the national capital was forbiddingly broader. The initial layout of new quarters involved some 750 acres of land of complicated ownership for an estimated increase of 150,000 in the urban population. The sense of urgency was keenly felt. This, coupled with municipal innocence or leniency in dealing with corporate interests, produced contracts that favored private gain over the public good. The city, through contractual agreement, acceded to the development of new quarters by private interests, and then, in return for the possession of the land for the streets and squares (guaranteed by the Expropriation Bill of 1865), it undertook their paving and maintenance and the bringing in of public services such as water, sewage, and transportation. The pattern started with the reaffirmation in February 1871 of the 1867 agreement between the city council and Monsignor De Merode, already mentioned, regarding his speculative project for the area of the Baths of Diocletian. Through a string of deals with speculators in the next twenty years, the formula changed but little.

The alternative, to lay down roads and services first and then sell building lots to individuals and firms, was slow and troublesome. It was tried, with disappointing progress, on one section of the Esquiline. Small capital was reluctant to move into skeletal neighborhoods so far from the traditional core. The city was obliged by law to sell the land to the highest bidder in public auction, a procedure that naturally worked to the benefit of corporate interests; selling the land in large or multiple lots, in contrast to parcels suitable to the means of individual low- and middle-income buyers, was expeditious and therefore preferred by the city. The major victim of this system was the poor. Drawn Rome-ward in the thousands by the promise of jobs in the fevered rebuilding campaign, or displaced from their homes by ameliorative demolition in the old center, they soon discovered that they were the last concern of the drafters of the master
plan. Private capital which undertook to develop the new quarters obviously preferred to build multistory housing for white-collar tenants who could afford high rent. Several attempts by the city to engage a private developer to build low-cost housing on municipal land collapsed on the issues of minimal room size and fixed rent. Subsidized housing, when resorted to, was allotted such meager sums that its impact on the gigantic crisis was negligible.  

Physical planning was largely in the hands of engineers. They produced projects for developers, for the city, province, and State, and as individual efforts of their own which they hoped to convince the city to adopt. Some were elected to the council and served on review commissions for various versions of the master plan. These men, most of them of advanced years at the Breach of Porta Pia, had been trained during the pontificate of Pius IX. They had worked on bridges, early rail links in the Papal States, and projects for new streets and squares, some of which had been executed. Those among them who had been flagrant supporters of the papal cause during the last bitter phase of the Risorgimento did not play a central part in the nationalist planning of the city. Andrea Busiri Vici is an obvious case. Active as papal architect and planner since about 1850 and head of the fabbrica of S. Peter’s both under Pius IX and Leo XIII, his proposals for the planning of laic Rome (e.g., the ambitious project of 1879 for Piazza Venezia) were shunned by the municipal administration; his name is absent from all planning commissions.  

By the same token, others who had been partisans of unity now reaped the profit of their conviction.

19. See Atti, ii (1871–1872), 1060ff. (Congregazione di Carità); ii, 1130ff. (Società di costruzione di case e quartieri), etc.

The most influential designer of the capital was Alessandro Viviani (1825–1905). A Roman engineer who had headed the construction of the papal railway system until he fell into disfavor for his political beliefs and was forced to go into private practice, Viviani was appointed the first director of the Ufficio tecnico in 1871 and retained that post until his death. His planning office in city hall dominated the shaping of the new Rome for three decades. In his last year he was supervising the building of the tunnel under the Quirinal. Rafaele Canevari and Angelo Vescovali, two protagonists in the planning of the urban stretch of the Tiber, were hydraulic engineers. So was Alessandro Betocchi, who had also authored a project for the papal regime related to the opening of a direct artery between Piazza Venezia and the Colosseum—an early predecessor of the Fascist Via dell’Impero (now Via dei Fori Imperiali).

In theory these men had intimate knowledge of the physical conditions of the city. They wrote informed books about the flooding of the Tiber, the topography of the hills, the structure of Roman soil. Yet for all this their planning projects for the expansion of Rome ignore or minimize the contours of the land. They talk of a relief map, but never work with one. Plans of perfect geometry are drawn, as though the land were as free of incident as the flat stretch of paper they use. In the section drawings for main new arteries they indicate levels with childlike simplicity. Authors of specific projects play down the effort and cost involved in their design; opponents exaggerate the consequences of going along with these schemes and propose alternatives of their own making. The debate is often unedifying.

In fact, the view of the planners of Roma capitale strikes one as strictly parochial. In the numerous reports that deal with the first plan of 1873, one encounters only the most cursory reference to the major planning events elsewhere in Europe. One man is praised for being “au courant with the great building operations being undertaken in other large European cities.” But his prescriptions for Rome are turned down. Here and there mention is made of “giardini inglesi,” Parisian boulevards, the tunnel under the Danube linking Buda with Pest. But no commission undertakes a serious study of contemporary planning situations as a prelude to its own deliberations. There is no evidence of extensive travel abroad. The theoretical arguments are confined to spare themes, such as the relative superiority of the straight street over the crooked one, and even then the discussion rarely goes beyond declaratory cant: “A straight long avenue is without doubt to be preferred from the point of view of aesthetics to [a] tortuous solution. . .”

A measure of the sophistication of the Roman planners can be gained from the contents of their libraries. The catalogue for the 1875 sale of one such library, Antonio Cipolla’s, shows that the main sources of inspiration were classical antiquity and contemporary France. Listed, among others, are books on Pompeii and the Baths of Titus and a generous selection of French titles including books by Blondel, César Daly, Viollet-le-Duc, Auguste Choisy, the complete run of Revue générale d’architecture, the Nouveau plan de Paris et son enceinte of 1866, publications dealing with the 1867 Universal Exposition in Paris, and several manuals of architecture. A glance at Cipolla’s 1872 project for Prati di Castello north of the Borgo, with its struggle for the accommodation of the rond-point, reveals his Parisian leanings (Fig. 4a).

But the planners of Roma capitale were most at home with local precedent, specifically the scheme of Sixtus V (1585–1590) and the more recent flurry of projects during the Napoleonic interlude, of which only Piazza del Popolo had been carried through. From the great Sistine program, the planners clung to the idea of joining central monuments with axial stretches of roadway. The trident too was singled out for emulation from general Renaissance practice. Formal parks and embankments for the urban length of the Tiber seem to be the remembered heritage of the designs by Giuseppe Valadier, Giulio and Giuseppe Camporesi, and others charged with transforming papal Rome into the glorious second capital of Bonaparte’s empire. To this source we might also attribute clearance projects relating to historic buildings—the demolition of the Borgo spina for a direct monumental approach to St. Peter’s, the enlargement of Piazza di Trevi, the liberation of the Colosseum and the Palatine—even though some of this was recurrent talk both before and after the French occupation.

The iconography of the new regime and contemporary exigencies forced some revision of this planning legacy. The Rome of 1870 was not Napoleon’s or Sixtus’s Rome. For example, the provision in the plan of the Camporesi Commission (Fig. 5) for two vast formal parks is reminiscent of

21. There is no major study of Viviani and his work.
22. See Archivio di Stato di Roma, Collezione di disegni e mappe, i, Cartella 82, no. 355; and iii, no. vii. The drawings are signed “Prof. Alessandro Betocchi Ing. Pontificio.”
23. In the report of the Committee of Four; see Roma, città e piani, p. 78.
25. I am indebted to the family of Giorgio Luciani for allowing me to look through Cipolla papers in its possession. Signora Luciani’s great-grandfather, the designer Domenico D’Amico, had served as executor of Cipolla’s will.
the Napoleonic plan for Rome, but their placement acknowledges the changing environmental reality. The earlier scheme had chosen for these parks the area beyond Piazza del Popolo, the traditional entrance to the city now emphasized by the Paris-Rome axis, and the archaeological zone south of the Forum that would underline the Napoleonic imagery of imperial revival. The Commission sought to accommodate the urban consequences of the railroad station in the northeast, the modern entrance to the city, and the imminent expansion on the eastern hills and the right bank by locating its own parks “in the proximity of Porta Maggiore” and on the Gianicolo. And if the “grand porticoes” the Commission prescribed for the new piazz of the Quirinale palace, the railroad station, and the exedra of the Baths of Diocletian, “as well as some of the new avenues which will lead from the station into the center of Rome,” harked back to the neo-imperial solutions of Napoleonic planning, they paid architectural homage equally to the new ruling dynasty of the House of Savoy by seeking to recreate the colonnaded streets and the uniformly lined, non-Roman squares of Turin.

So too with the great Sistine pattern which had strapped the eastern half of the city, and over which now the new quarters were to be built. In terms of density, there had not been much change in these parts between 1590 and 1870. The Camporesi Commission responded to this grand skeleton; it saw planning through the eyes of Sixtus and Domenico Fontana—a matter of civilizing the countryside by means of single-minded arteries between pairs of monumental nodes. But the Breach of Porta Pia had created new foci to anchor the stretch of these arteries. Santa Maria Maggiore and the adjacent Sistine villa were no longer the ultimate umbilicus. This central function had now been preempted by the intended royal seat on the Quirinal. That and the presence of the railroad station determined the radial emanation of main avenues whose web could only partially be adjusted to the Sistine antecedent (Fig. 5). Of the three avenues that took off from the station, perhaps forming a trident, only one led for certain to a Sistine landmark—the obelisk of Piazza dell’Esquilino that marked the space in front of the tribune of Santa Maria Maggiore. To this same obelisk was directed the easternmost of the trident

Fig. 5. A schematic reconstruction of the plan prepared by the Camporesi Commission, based on its report of 10 November 1870.
of streets that issued from the porticoed piazza of the Quirinale palace. The westernmost prong corresponded to Via dei Serpenti, now extended in a straight line until the Colosseum (the present Via degli Annibaldi). The middle prong led to the Lateran along Via in Merulana traced by Sixtus’s predecessor, Gregory XIII (1572–1585). This last avenue was conducted northward beyond the Quirinal in the Commission’s plan, along Via dei Due Macelli and Via del Babuino, in an uninterrupted line all the way from the obelisk of Piazza del Popolo to that set up by Sixtus in front of the north transept of S. Giovanni in Laterano. Thereby the backbone of Sixtus’s scheme, Strada Felice, which had stretched breathtakingly from Piazza del Popolo to Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, was now being moved west, to pass through (or rather, under) the new King’s palace.

When the eastern hills were given their final form by Viviani in 1873, the Commission’s two tridents disappeared; but the planning of the Esquiline around a large rectangular square, Piazza Vittorio Emanuele, confirmed the displacement of the Sistine tracery (Fig. 2). A new trident that led out of the short south side of this piazza corresponded to the older scheme only in its middle prong, Via Conte Verde/ Via di Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, which lay along the path of Strada Felice. The other two prongs, if extended until the walls, would touch them at Porta S. Giovanni and Porta Maggiore, two termini that had no significance whatever for Sixtus’s scheme. The central position of Santa Maria Maggiore from which the great avenues had radiated in syderis formam was now being usurped by the new Piazza Vittorio Emanuele, and the logic of its centrality was secular and abstracted. And with the naming of the piazza after the first King of Italy and its radial avenues after Savoy princes—Emanuele Filiberto, Principe Eugenio—the laic order of Roma capitale was made to triumph totally over the papal urbanism of the centuries since the Renaissance.

It remains to consider, in conclusion, what the concept of the Roman piano regolatore meant to its makers. There is little doubt that the engineers and architects trying their hand at it thought of the plan primarily as a golden chance for grand design. The straight avenues, tridents, rond-points, and residential grids were born of aesthetic impulse. The conviction reigned that the design of cities was an extension of architecture, which was the first among equals in the family of belle arti. Budgets, traffic rationale, the surmounting of topographical and social difficulties—these supplied ammunition for the defense of a beautiful design after the fact rather than being primary determinants of that design. Beginning with the Camporesi Commission, whose precise mandate was “to study the expansion (ingrandimento) and enhancement (abbellimento) of Rome,” the experts were clearly encouraged to think of their job in more than sensible, practical, or social terms. Even Viviani, whose position as head of the Ufficio tecnico entailed the responsible appraisal for the council of all aspects of proposed projects, was often carried away by the look of things. It is clear, for example, that his reworking of the Cipolla plan for Prati (Fig. 4b), notably the large rectangular piazza set on end with diagonal streets leading out of the corners, was conditioned in the main by the desire to repeat, more or less, his own scheme for the Esquiline at the other end of the city, where the space of the main planted square, Piazza Vittorio Emanuele, similarly dilated into diagonal corner avenues (Fig. 2). This is one indication that Viviani sought to discipline the spreading city into a visual pattern of echoing themes and correspondences, at least in two dimensions.

For the politicians whose task it was to approve the provisions of the master plan and secure the funds needed to see them through, the situation was different. Setting aside the extreme view that legal master plans crushed the rights of private property, two distinct philosophies can be detected. The more expedient view held that the plan was an ideal vision. It included everything the city might wish to accomplish for its physical well-being, but which did not all need to be done. There were priorities. The Armellini Committee which reviewed Viviani’s 1873 version of the plan established three categories of varying urgency in evaluating its provisions. The third category it considered luxury; the second, useful features whose execution could be postponed. Only the first category was pressing and had to be executed promptly.27

In rejecting this method of classification, the progressive mayor Luigi Pianciani forcefully expressed the other view—that a master plan was not the sum total of independent features that might or might not be realized, but a general, coherent program carefully thought out as a binding blueprint for the city. There could be only two kinds of urban projects: those that must be included in the master plan, and those that the council did not consider essential enough to merit the status of eminent domain. For the plan, once passed, must be inviolable; all its provisions must command equal urgency.28

The council showed its indecision between these two prevailing views by adopting the plan, with some changes, and at the same time appending a rider to the effect that “the

council reserved the right to resolve annually, or whenever
called upon to do so by the Giunta, whether, and which of,
the projects included in the plan should be executed . . .”\(^{29}\)
(my emphasis). In the end this compromising stance carried
the day. As Viviani pointed out, even without specific cat-
egories the instrument of setting priorities was in the council’s
hand. The legal term for the validity of a master plan, ac-
gording to the Expropriation Bill of 1865, was twenty-five
years: the city could choose to take its time with details of
the plan, or let time run out on them and thus avoid having
to see them through.\(^{30}\) In the meantime, the plan guaranteed
a blanket approval for all desirable expropriation and a
stated long-term policy that relieved property owners from
the anxiety of not knowing where they stood. The Commit-
tee of Four summed up in 1871:

A master plan is far from being a plan for immediate execution. It
represents that which should come to be in the near or more distant
future, as decided solely by the municipal authorities. It is therefore
principally a guide and a norm whereby the administration might
forestall any obstruction of, impediment to, or difficulty for the exec-
tion of its provisions, in due time, by new (unauthorized) construc-
tion or any other way whatever; and also the means whereby every
new work is coordinated with a view toward the whole and in line
with the concepts studied in advance, so that following this road,
slowly and almost unwittingly, one obtains in time the desired urban
systematization.\(^{31}\)

In practice, the Plan of 1883 as finally approved turned out to be less constraining than its enemies feared. The document
determined, to a large degree, what happened to the city-form for the next twenty-five years, until the passage of
the Plan of 1909. But by no means altogether. The granting
of concessions to private industry for entire quarters con-
tinued: the quarters of San Cosimato and Ludovisi material-
ized in spite of the plan, the latter at the expense of the
beloved Villa Ludovisi. Speculators sought quicker profits
by bolting the legal restraints of the plan and spilling reck-
lessly outside the walls where land was cheap. And there
were remarkable developments within. The monument to
Vitor Emmanuel swallowed an entire neighborhood in the
heart of the city and reshaped Piazza Venezia and its vicinity
in ways unpredicted by the plan.

All this, too, is a separate piece of urban history that must
be told in the fullness of the evidence. But before the post
mortem, before critical judgment of the plan from our present
point vantage point and the various political perspectives that
underlie our evaluation of the Liberal State, we must estab-
lish as truthfully as we can the context in which the plan
was born. That has been the sole object of this historical
exordium.

29. *Capitolium*, IX (1933), 58.

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**CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE**

**30 September 1870** Camporesi Commission created by the State-ap-
pointed Giunta for Rome. Members: P. Campo-
resi, president, S. Bianchi, N. Carnevali, A. Ci-
polla, F. Fontana, D. Jannetti, A. Mercandetti,
G. Partini, A. Trevellini, V. Vespiaghi, A. Vivi-
ani. In a few days Vespiaghi, Jannetti, Fontana, and
Trevellini are replaced by L. Amadei, L. Gabet, and
P. Rosa, vice-president.

**10 November 1870** Report of Camporesi Commission issued (see
Fig. 5).

**28 February 1871** Council ratifies agreement of April 1867 between
Francesco Saverio De Merode and the city for the
development of a residential quarter on the Quir-
inal. Agreement signed on 22 March.

**6 March 1871** Cipolla, Partini, and Gabet resign from the
Camporesi Commission.

**19 April 1871** P. Camporesi presents to the council his own
version of a master plan.

**3 June 1871** Two separate committees appointed by the
council: one to review individual development
projects (G. Angelini, M. Massimo, A. Spada),
and one to review total master plans (the so-
called Committee of Four consisting of A.
Betocchi, R. Canevari, F. Azzurri [replaced by F.
Giordano], and E. Ruspoli).

**19 June 1871** Angelini Committee submits report.

**1 July 1871** Official transfer of capital from Florence.

**3 August 1871** Committee of Four submits report.

**14 September 1871** Council approves Esquiline layout by Viviani,
Cipolla, Camporesi.

**28 November 1871** Master plan of the *Ufficio tecnico*, an amalgam
of the plans of the Camporesi Commission,
Camporesi himself, Mirotti, Paniconi, and the
Committee of Four, is approved by the council.

**13 January 1872** Master plan posted for a fortnight’s scrutiny by
the public, in accordance with procedures re-
quired by the Expropriation Bill of 1865.
25 February 1872  Royal decree issued for the expropriation of properties on the Esquiline.
29 February 1872  Agreement between city and Società generale di credito immobiliare for the development of Castro Pretorio.
20 March 1872  Ufficio tecnico project for Testaccio approved.
22 March 1872  Agreement between city and Guerrini/Rossi for the development of the Caelian.
24 April 1872  Giunta creates the Commissione archeologica as a standing committee.
5 July 1872  Viviani project for Via Nazionale (leading to Trevi and Piazza Sciarra) approved.
11 July 1872  Firmino Picard wins contract for Testaccio.
13 July 1872  Cipolla project for Prati rejected by the council despite endorsement of Viviani.
31 October 1872  Council approves plan for subsidized housing to be built by the Società edificatrice italiana on their land (ex-Villa Campana and Orto Sallusti). Agreement collapses on 4 November.
1 December 1872  Viviani appointed overall head of the Fifth Department (Edilità e lavori pubblici).
30 December 1872  Castro Pretorio streets named after military engagements that led to unity (Cernaia, Goito, Varese, etc.).
7 January 1873  New building code passed, replacing papal code of 1864.
5 May 1873  Agreement with Società di costruzione di case e quartieri for economy housing on Esquiline.
9 July 1873  The master plan, as revised after its public viewing, is presented to council. Committee elected to evaluate it: F. Armellini, president, O. Brauzzi (replaced by G. Montiroli), A. Cipolla, L. Gabet, and E. Ruspoli.
1 August 1873  Streets of the Caelian and Esquiline named.
3 September 1873  Armellini Committee submits report.
6 October 1873  Famous discourse of Pianciani on the master plan delivered to council.
18 October 1873  Final council approval of the master plan.
16 March 1874  Council appoints committee to review aspects of the plan in progress (Viminal, Esquiline, Testaccio, Via Nazionale).
22 June 1874  The committee issues its report.
22 April 1875  Council reverses itself on Via Nazionale; adopts alternate scheme that brings the street into Piazza Venezia.
1875–1880  The Master Plan of 1873 lies in abeyance due to the uncertainty of its financial prospects.
27 September 1880  Council ratifies initial agreement on State assistance in the cost of the master plan. Signed by Prime Minister Cairoli and Mayor Armellini on 14 November.
13 February 1881  Agreement ratified between city and State on a new plan for the Viminal.
14 May 1881  State Assistance Bill becomes law.
20 July 1881  Council instructs Viviani to bring master plan up to date, in line with State Assistance Bill.
12 December 1881  Committee set up to review the revised plan: F. Nobili-Vителески, president, S. Bianchi, A. Bracci, G. Bompiani, G. B. De Rossi, A. De Vecchis, M. Otroboni, E. Renazzi.
27 April 1882  Committee issues its report.
26 June 1882  Final vote of council on revised plan.
9 August 1882  Appeals against provisions of the plan rejected by the council.
31 August 1882  Plan approved by the State.
8 March 1883  Plan given final sanction by royal decree.